本文发表在 rolia.net 枫下论坛＜本文发表于: 相约加拿大:枫下论坛 www.rolia.net/forum ＞
During World War II, Switzerland was not actually attacked. Occasional incidents were absolutely insignificant in view of the dimensions of the Second World War. Incidents proceeded more frequently from British and American bombers than from Germany or Italy. Nevertheless German troops were regarded as a really serious threat. Unlike for other nations (for example Sweden), this threat was real, insofar as Hitler did have plans to incorporate all German-speaking regions into his empire (including 70% of Switzerland) and to integrate the rest of Switzerland (french and italian speaking areas) into France and Italy respectively. (see Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - World War II, final report, p. 87)

The plans for the attack were ready in the drawers of the German army. (final report, p. 84) German broadcast propaganda went "Die Schweiz, das kleine Stachelschwein, nehmen wir auf dem Rückweg ein" ["We'll take Switzerland, the small porcupine, on our way back home!"] (quoted after oral family tradition, consistent with lots of independent other oral sources published in the internet). - and this was taken quite seriously. Nevertheless the attack was never carried out. Why this?
Antitank-Obstacle Switzerland, World War II
Antitank-Obstacle in Switzerland, World War II

*

Switzerland demonstrated military readiness with the general mobilization in 1939 and border occupation by 430,000 troops (20 % of the employed persons). However, their equipment was not very up to date. Eugen Bircher, a Swiss colonel at the time, probably made a correct assessment of the situation when saying that the Germans would have been able to advance towards the Swiss capital Berne with a single tank regiment easily. (Edgar Bonjour, Neutralität, Bd. IV, 1970, p. 379 quoted after Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - World War II, final report, German edition, p. 92. Note that the english edition of the final report, p. 89f does not give the important adverb "easily")
This assessment was shared (but not declared publicly) by a broad majority of leading Swiss Army officers. As a consequence Switzerland's commander in chief General Henri Guisan developped his famous "Reduit Concept" in summer 1940, according to which the Swiss Army would have retreated into the alps relatively soon if attacked, but would have kept up resistance based on some sort of guerilla tactics from there.
Consequently the term "Grenzbesetzung" [occupation of the borders] was replaced by "Aktivdienst" [active (military) service, the term "active" was meant as a counterpoint to 3-week military repetition courses that Swiss soldiers have to attend annually.] After the (international) debate on Switzerland's refugee politics and looted jewish assets in the 1990's there is now a new (internal) debate about the Reduit Concept among members of the so-called Aktivdienstgeneration [generation of people that were called to active military service]. It seems, that they are becoming aware only today, how soon General Guisan would have retreated Swiss troops from the borders into the Reduit, trying to prevent useless bloodshed on terrain, where the aggressor could use his tanks and aircraft, but leaving the majority of the population under occupation. The main strategy, however, was deterrence rather than fighting - and this worked out better than a sober external observer would have estimated. Of course, General Guisan did not communicate his detailed plans publicly in 1940 ...
*

Integrating the German speaking regions (74%) of Switzerland into the Third Reich - as Adolf Hitler did with Austria in 1938 and planned with Switzerland - would have led to civil disobedience and massive "internal" criticism within the Reich, thereby absorbing too many forces of secret police and armed forces and it might even have strengthened the internal resistance in Germany against the Nazi regime. The Swiss concept of Spiritual Defense also had a deterring effect insofar as due to this movement the Swiss population was not at all "demoralized and ready for capitulation", as Adolf Hitler tried to get his victims by massive propaganda.
*

Switzerland's alpine railways were of central importance for transports between Germany and Italy . In case of an attack on Switzerland, the Swiss Army would have destroyed important bridges and tunnels, and would have paralyzed the connection for years. The Swiss compromise offer to Germany and Italy was, that Switzerland would allow transports between Germany and Italy in sealed box cars without checking the contents - in exchange for the supply of vital raw materials and goods. This obviously was more attractive to Germany than a destroyed railway line. On the other hand, exporting industry products (chemicals, pharmceutics, machinery and electrical equipment) was far more vital for Switzerland as a small country than importing was for Germany and Italy - big nations having together 25 times the Swiss population and being able to use industrial resources all over occupied Europe.
*

Some historians say, that financial services, especially buying gold from Germany in exchange for convertible currency (Germany's national currency was no longer accepted as a means of payment in the international markets) was also an important factor. The Independent Commission of Experts showed that the Chairman of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) did not use this argument during the Second World War. "It was only after the war ... that the SNB directors claimed that their gold transactions and positive relations with Germany had prevented Germany from seriously considering the option of military operations against Switzerland. ... One might just as well claim that with its «business as usual» approach, the SNB had effectively prevented Switzerland from using the convertibility of its currency as a trump card in the economic negotiations with Germany, thus neutralising the dissuasive potential." (Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - World War II, final report, p. 247f)

The defense of Switzerland was thus based only on three columns (army, Spiritual Defense and alpine transit), but all of them were quite weak. So it was ever more important to combine them in a most effective way. The international debate on Switzerland's role in World War II has split public opinion into two camps: Swiss traditionalists defend the glorious role of the Swiss Army while leftist critics point to anything that has been done wrong according to moral standards. A sober look at the real balance of power between Germany and Austria vs. tiny Switzerland and the fact that France and Great Britain were not able to prevent Germany from occupying France in 1940 shows that Switzerland's Army (even backed up by Spiritual Defense) had absolutely no chance to withstand an attack and defend its borders.

Therefore an attempt to rely on military deterrence alone would inevitably have ended in being defeated - and thus practically all Swiss citizens of Jewish origin as well as some 100,000 military and some 60,000 civilian refugees admitted by Switzerland would have faced deportation to the concentration and death camps of the Nazis.

I estimate that alpine transportation was the key "joker" of Switzerland. Jokers have no effect, however, if not played out. An alpine transit railway with severe restrictions for use would have been of limited interest for Nazi Germany just as a destroyed one, and it would not have served as an argument to prevent a Nazi attack on Switzerland. Under acute threat it was obviously very difficult to estimate, how many concessions would convince Adolf Hitler to renounce on an attack. Given the weak negotiating position thus no other choice remained for Switzerland than to permit rather too many of the often criticized transports than too few.
＜本文发表于: 相约加拿大:枫下论坛 www.rolia.net/forum ＞更多精彩文章及讨论，请光临枫下论坛 rolia.net