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后格林斯潘时代的美国经济 潜在危机迟早爆发 (ZT)

本文发表在 rolia.net 枫下论坛格林斯潘先生,这位担任了美国联邦储备委员会主席18年半之久的传奇人物于1月31号正式卸任。而他留下来的美国经济,是否会像普遍认为的那样健康持续的增长呢?

格林斯潘在任期间,美国经济一直保持着比较高速的增长和相对较低的通货膨胀率;另外,在其货币政策指挥下的美国金融市场也成功地度过了一系列全球范围内的金融风暴危机;而在面临2000~2001年证券市场泡沫、9-11恐怖袭击和当今油价暴涨的压力下,美国经济仍旧表现出了“不可思议”的增长势头。这些令人瞩目的成就,给格林斯潘赢得了巨大荣誉,例如:美国总统自由勋章、英国爵士身份以及法国荣誉勋章等等,同时也广泛获得了来自经济学家、经济评论者、政治家以及投资者的赞誉。

以牺牲未来为代价的增长

不可否认的是,格林斯潘的货币政策确实成为刺激美国消费和需求的一剂良药,不仅对美国经济,同时也对全球经济产生了一定程度的积极作用。尤其是,他的低息货币政策正好迎合了全球化和信息化的浪潮,一方面:该政策刺激了美国国内消费,从而一定程度上带动了GDP增长;而这一巨大的消费需求,特别是对廉价商品的渴望,又直接或间接的帮助了像中国、印度以及前苏联地区等市场的开放和建立,并让他们从中受益。另一方面,由于全球化信息化的加速,使得大量第三世界的廉价商品涌入日趋增长的美国消费市场,使得消费增加的同时传统商品价格并没有明显上扬,抑制了该领域的通货膨胀。

客观地说,近20年来美国经济快速增长和低通货膨胀率是多方面因素形成的,例如:美国经济结构本身的优势、相比之下较为灵活的劳动力市场和商品市场、移民的快速增长、良好的银行体系以及全球化信息化大环境等等;而格林斯潘货币政策对经济增长的作用相比是有限的。从最近的美国经济发展来看,尽管其低息政策对经济起到了刺激作用,特别是通过消费市场的繁荣,但却造成了前一段时间股票证券市场的泡沫现象和当前房地产市场价格的持续走高。

正如英国《经济学家》杂志评论的那样,持续增长的消费势头可以促进GDP的增长,但却是以个人存款率负增长、家庭债务负担加重和巨额的经常账户赤字为代价换来的。换句话说,近来美国经济的增长不是建立在自身收入增加和生产效率本身提高上的,而是建立在牺牲未来的基础上。

《经济学家》杂志长期以来都在质疑格林斯潘先生没有采取有效的限制措施来扼制90年代后期证券市场泡沫和当前房地产市场过热的现象,相反,他却保持低息政策长期不变。因此该杂志在评论时,引用了20世纪初奥地利经济学家路德维希·冯·米塞斯(Ludwig von Mises)的话:“有时候对我们来说燃烧自己的家具取暖是权宜之计,但是我们不应该让自己相信这是一条相当不错的取暖方式。”

从目前的美国经济形势来看,由于就业创造能力的减弱和工资增长幅度放缓,实际收入增长也随之开始放缓。根据摩根斯坦利银行数据,美国私营经济劳动补偿最近四年上涨了12%,而前一个五年该数据为20%。因此消费增长将主要依赖于房地产市场和信贷消费的支撑,最近几年美国经济GDP增长90%的贡献来源于消费市场和房地产建设。因此一旦房地产市场“泡沫”的破灭,加上目前巨额账户赤字在将来所带来的信贷危机,(据预测,2006年美国经常账户赤字可能扩大到GDP总量的6.7%)首先将直接冲击到消费市场,抑制其增长;其次将不可避免的给美国经济GDP总量增长带来剧烈的冲击,导致经济增长明显衰退。

也许到重新平衡的时间了

所以,格林斯潘卸任后留下的美国经济,可能并没有想象中的那么健康和可信;它实际上存在着很大程度的潜在危机,尽管这个危机可能并不会马上爆发,但是如果经济继续如此不平衡的发展下去,危机爆发是迟早的。也许正如米塞斯比喻的那样,当所有的家具都烧完之后,承受的将有可能是很长一段时间的深寒。

因此,对于格林斯潘的继任者----本·伯南克先生来说,将面临着艰巨的任务。一方面,他要摆脱格林斯潘时期货币政策的巨大影响力,尤其是长期的低息政策,该政策在美国经济学家、政治家、消费者和投资者中有着十分高的可信度。另一方面,作为联邦储备委员会的主席,他首要的职责应该是抑制通货膨胀保持经济稳定增长,但是为了缓解经济不平衡发展,他同样需要抑制消费增长从而减轻经常账户赤字和个人债务的压力;因此,如何平衡经济增长和抑制消费的关系将是一个不小的挑战。

目前为止,没有谁能够预测伯南克会如何面对这些问题。但是从其背景来看,也许他会继续采取低息政策,毕竟利息的升高会给成千上万的美国家庭带来更多的债务负担,从而导致更多的人面临破产危机,这无论对经济增长还是经济稳定来说,都不是一个好消息;另外,根据伯南克先生曾经的研究背景,他更倾向认为利率工具不适合抑制资产价格的快速增长,比如房产和证券价格,除非其过度的增长影响到了通货膨胀率。

不管怎样,后格林斯潘时代的美国经济虽然短期内看仍旧会保持着比较好的势头,但危机也同时存在,其根源或多或少与格林斯潘任期内长期的低息政策有所关系。所以,不管其继任者愿不愿意,也许到了放慢增长脚步、重新平衡调整的时间了,否则,危机爆发那一天,经济大衰退将不可避免的唤起人们的噩梦。更多精彩文章及讨论,请光临枫下论坛 rolia.net
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Replies, comments and Discussions:

  • 枫下茶话 / 美国话题 / 后格林斯潘时代的美国经济 潜在危机迟早爆发 (ZT)
    本文发表在 rolia.net 枫下论坛格林斯潘先生,这位担任了美国联邦储备委员会主席18年半之久的传奇人物于1月31号正式卸任。而他留下来的美国经济,是否会像普遍认为的那样健康持续的增长呢?

    格林斯潘在任期间,美国经济一直保持着比较高速的增长和相对较低的通货膨胀率;另外,在其货币政策指挥下的美国金融市场也成功地度过了一系列全球范围内的金融风暴危机;而在面临2000~2001年证券市场泡沫、9-11恐怖袭击和当今油价暴涨的压力下,美国经济仍旧表现出了“不可思议”的增长势头。这些令人瞩目的成就,给格林斯潘赢得了巨大荣誉,例如:美国总统自由勋章、英国爵士身份以及法国荣誉勋章等等,同时也广泛获得了来自经济学家、经济评论者、政治家以及投资者的赞誉。

    以牺牲未来为代价的增长

    不可否认的是,格林斯潘的货币政策确实成为刺激美国消费和需求的一剂良药,不仅对美国经济,同时也对全球经济产生了一定程度的积极作用。尤其是,他的低息货币政策正好迎合了全球化和信息化的浪潮,一方面:该政策刺激了美国国内消费,从而一定程度上带动了GDP增长;而这一巨大的消费需求,特别是对廉价商品的渴望,又直接或间接的帮助了像中国、印度以及前苏联地区等市场的开放和建立,并让他们从中受益。另一方面,由于全球化信息化的加速,使得大量第三世界的廉价商品涌入日趋增长的美国消费市场,使得消费增加的同时传统商品价格并没有明显上扬,抑制了该领域的通货膨胀。

    客观地说,近20年来美国经济快速增长和低通货膨胀率是多方面因素形成的,例如:美国经济结构本身的优势、相比之下较为灵活的劳动力市场和商品市场、移民的快速增长、良好的银行体系以及全球化信息化大环境等等;而格林斯潘货币政策对经济增长的作用相比是有限的。从最近的美国经济发展来看,尽管其低息政策对经济起到了刺激作用,特别是通过消费市场的繁荣,但却造成了前一段时间股票证券市场的泡沫现象和当前房地产市场价格的持续走高。

    正如英国《经济学家》杂志评论的那样,持续增长的消费势头可以促进GDP的增长,但却是以个人存款率负增长、家庭债务负担加重和巨额的经常账户赤字为代价换来的。换句话说,近来美国经济的增长不是建立在自身收入增加和生产效率本身提高上的,而是建立在牺牲未来的基础上。

    《经济学家》杂志长期以来都在质疑格林斯潘先生没有采取有效的限制措施来扼制90年代后期证券市场泡沫和当前房地产市场过热的现象,相反,他却保持低息政策长期不变。因此该杂志在评论时,引用了20世纪初奥地利经济学家路德维希·冯·米塞斯(Ludwig von Mises)的话:“有时候对我们来说燃烧自己的家具取暖是权宜之计,但是我们不应该让自己相信这是一条相当不错的取暖方式。”

    从目前的美国经济形势来看,由于就业创造能力的减弱和工资增长幅度放缓,实际收入增长也随之开始放缓。根据摩根斯坦利银行数据,美国私营经济劳动补偿最近四年上涨了12%,而前一个五年该数据为20%。因此消费增长将主要依赖于房地产市场和信贷消费的支撑,最近几年美国经济GDP增长90%的贡献来源于消费市场和房地产建设。因此一旦房地产市场“泡沫”的破灭,加上目前巨额账户赤字在将来所带来的信贷危机,(据预测,2006年美国经常账户赤字可能扩大到GDP总量的6.7%)首先将直接冲击到消费市场,抑制其增长;其次将不可避免的给美国经济GDP总量增长带来剧烈的冲击,导致经济增长明显衰退。

    也许到重新平衡的时间了

    所以,格林斯潘卸任后留下的美国经济,可能并没有想象中的那么健康和可信;它实际上存在着很大程度的潜在危机,尽管这个危机可能并不会马上爆发,但是如果经济继续如此不平衡的发展下去,危机爆发是迟早的。也许正如米塞斯比喻的那样,当所有的家具都烧完之后,承受的将有可能是很长一段时间的深寒。

    因此,对于格林斯潘的继任者----本·伯南克先生来说,将面临着艰巨的任务。一方面,他要摆脱格林斯潘时期货币政策的巨大影响力,尤其是长期的低息政策,该政策在美国经济学家、政治家、消费者和投资者中有着十分高的可信度。另一方面,作为联邦储备委员会的主席,他首要的职责应该是抑制通货膨胀保持经济稳定增长,但是为了缓解经济不平衡发展,他同样需要抑制消费增长从而减轻经常账户赤字和个人债务的压力;因此,如何平衡经济增长和抑制消费的关系将是一个不小的挑战。

    目前为止,没有谁能够预测伯南克会如何面对这些问题。但是从其背景来看,也许他会继续采取低息政策,毕竟利息的升高会给成千上万的美国家庭带来更多的债务负担,从而导致更多的人面临破产危机,这无论对经济增长还是经济稳定来说,都不是一个好消息;另外,根据伯南克先生曾经的研究背景,他更倾向认为利率工具不适合抑制资产价格的快速增长,比如房产和证券价格,除非其过度的增长影响到了通货膨胀率。

    不管怎样,后格林斯潘时代的美国经济虽然短期内看仍旧会保持着比较好的势头,但危机也同时存在,其根源或多或少与格林斯潘任期内长期的低息政策有所关系。所以,不管其继任者愿不愿意,也许到了放慢增长脚步、重新平衡调整的时间了,否则,危机爆发那一天,经济大衰退将不可避免的唤起人们的噩梦。更多精彩文章及讨论,请光临枫下论坛 rolia.net
    • to be honest, I didn't get the point.
    • "Back in 1987 everyone was worried about Greenspan. Who was going to replace Paul Volcker?" "We think Bernanke has the mettle to do a fine job."
    • 不要危言耸听
      • The Economist 作为权威性的杂志,其分析报导还是比较客观的。
    • 这种充满了自己都不知所云的猜测和推论的文章绝不可能是《经济学家》刊发的。更象是某中国“经济学家”的习作。
      • I guess this the artical from "The Economist" refered in the previous post. It is a good artical and explained one point of view.
        本文发表在 rolia.net 枫下论坛Danger time for America
        Jan 12th 2006
        From The Economist print edition

        The economy that Alan Greenspan is about to hand over is in a much less healthy state than is popularly assumed

        DESPITE his rather appealing personal humility, the tributes lavished upon Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, become more exuberant by the day. Ahead of his retirement on January 31st, he has been widely and extravagantly acclaimed by economic commentators, politicians and investors. After all, during much of his 18½ years in office America enjoyed rapid growth with low inflation, and he successfully steered the economy around a series of financial hazards. In his final days of glory, it may therefore seem churlish to question his record. However, Mr Greenspan's departure could well mark a high point for America's economy, with a period of sluggish growth ahead. This is not so much because he is leaving, but because of what he is leaving behind: the biggest economic imbalances in American history.

        One should not exaggerate Mr Greenspan's influence—both good and bad—over the economy. Like all central bankers he is constrained by huge uncertainties about how the economy works, and by the limits of what monetary policy can do (it can affect inflation, but it cannot increase the long-term rate of growth). He controls only short-term interest rates, not bond yields, taxes or regulation. Yet for all these constraints, Mr Greenspan has long been the world's most important economic policy maker—and during an exceptional period when globalisation and information technology have been transforming the world economy. His reign has coincided with the opening up to trade and global capital flows of China, India, the former Soviet Union and many other previously closed economies. And Mr Greenspan's policies have helped to support globalisation: the robust American demand and huge appetite for imports that he facilitated made it easier for these economies to emerge and embrace open markets. The benefits to poorer nations have been huge.


        So far as the American economy is concerned, however, the Fed's policies of the past decade look like having painful long-term costs. It is true that the economy has shown amazing resilience in the face of the bursting in 2000-01 of the biggest stockmarket bubble in history, of terrorist attacks and of a tripling of oil prices. Mr Greenspan's admirers attribute this to the Fed's enhanced credibility under his charge. Others point to flexible wages and prices, rapid immigration, a sounder banking system and globalisation as factors that have made the economy more resilient to shocks.

        The economy's greater flexibility may indeed provide a shock-absorber. A spurt in productivity has also boosted growth. But the main reason why America's growth has remained strong in recent years has been a massive monetary stimulus. The Fed held real interest rates negative for several years, and even today real rates remain low. Thanks to globalisation, new technology and that vaunted flexibility, which have all helped to reduce the prices of many goods, cheap money has not spilled into traditional inflation, but into rising asset prices instead—first equities and now housing. The Economist has long criticised Mr Greenspan for not trying to restrain the stockmarket bubble in the late 1990s, and then, after it burst, for inflating a housing bubble by holding interest rates low for so long (see article). The problem is not the rising asset prices themselves but rather their effect on the economy. By borrowing against capital gains on their homes, households have been able to consume more than they earn. Robust consumer spending has boosted GDP growth, but at the cost of a negative personal saving rate, a growing burden of household debt and a huge current-account deficit.

        Burning the furniture
        Ben Bernanke, Mr Greenspan's successor, likes to explain America's current-account deficit as the inevitable consequence of a saving glut in the rest of the world. Yet a large part of the blame lies with the Fed's own policies, which have allowed growth in domestic demand to outstrip supply for no less than ten years on the trot. Part of America's current prosperity is based not on genuine gains in income, nor on high productivity growth, but on borrowing from the future. The words of Ludwig von Mises, an Austrian economist of the early 20th century, nicely sum up the illusion: “It may sometimes be expedient for a man to heat the stove with his furniture. But he should not delude himself by believing that he has discovered a wonderful new method of heating his premises.”

        As a result of weaker job creation than usual and sluggish real wage growth, American incomes have increased much more slowly than in previous recoveries. According to Morgan Stanley, over the past four years total private-sector labour compensation has risen by only 12% in real terms, compared with an average gain of 20% over the comparable period of the previous five expansions. Without strong gains in incomes, the growth in consumer spending has to a large extent been based on increases in house prices and credit. In recent months Mr Greenspan himself has given warnings that house prices may fall, and that this in turn could cause consumer spending to slow. In addition, he suggests that foreigners will eventually become less eager to finance the current-account deficit. Central banks in Asia and oil-producing countries have so far been happy to buy dollar assets in order to hold down their own currencies. However, there is a limit to their willingness to keep accumulating dollar reserves. Chinese officials last week offered hints that they are looking eventually to diversify China's foreign-exchange reserves. Over the next couple of years the dollar is likely to fall and bond yields rise as investors demand higher compensation for risk.

        When house-price rises flatten off, and therefore the room for further equity withdrawal dries up, consumer spending will stumble. Given that consumer spending and residential construction have accounted for 90% of GDP growth in recent years, it is hard to see how this can occur without a sharp slowdown in the economy.

        Handovers to a new Fed chairman are always tricky moments. They have often been followed by some sort of financial turmoil, such as the 1987 stockmarket crash, only two months after Mr Greenspan took over. This handover takes place with the economy in an unusually vulnerable state, thanks to its imbalances. The interest rates that Mr Bernanke will inherit will be close to neutral, neither restraining nor stimulating the economy. But America's domestic demand needs to grow more slowly in order to bring the saving rate and the current-account deficit back to sustainable levels. If demand fails to slow, he will need to push rates higher. This will be risky, given households' heavy debts. After 13 increases in interest rates, the tide of easy money is now flowing out, and many American households are going to be shockingly exposed. In the words of Warren Buffett, “It's only when the tide goes out that you can see who's swimming naked.”

        How should Mr Bernanke respond to falling house prices and a sharp economic slowdown when they come? While he is even more opposed than Mr Greenspan to the idea of restraining asset-price bubbles, he seems just as keen to slash interest rates when bubbles burst to prevent a downturn. He is likely to continue the current asymmetric policy of never raising interest rates to curb rising asset prices, but always cutting rates after prices fall. This is dangerous as it encourages excessive risk taking and allows the imbalances to grow ever larger, making the eventual correction even worse. If the imbalances are to unwind, America needs to accept a period in which domestic demand grows more slowly than output.

        The big question is whether the rest of the world will slow too. The good news is that growth is becoming more broadly based, as demand in the euro area and Japan has been picking up, and fears about an imminent hard landing in China have faded. America kept the world going during troubled times. But now it is time for others to take the lead.更多精彩文章及讨论,请光临枫下论坛 rolia.net
        • 谢谢,这个应该是原文。